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Abstract—With the growing use of underwater acoustic com-
munications (UWAC) for both industrial and military operations,
there is a need to ensure communication security. A particu-
lar challenge is represented by underwater acoustic networks
(UWANs), which are often left unattended over long periods of
time. Currently, due to physical and performance limitations,
UWAC packets rarely include encryption, leaving the UWAN
exposed to external attacks faking legitimate messages. In this
paper, we propose a new algorithm for message authentication
in a UWAN setting. We begin by observing that, due to the
strong spatial dependency of the underwater acoustic channel,
an attacker can attempt to mimic the channel associated with the
legitimate transmitter only for a small set of receivers, typically
just for a single one. Taking this into account, our scheme relies
on trusted nodes that independently help a sink node in the
authentication process. For each incoming packet, the sink fuses
beliefs evaluated by the trusted nodes to reach an authentication
decision. These beliefs are based on estimated statistical channel
parameters, chosen to be the most sensitive to the transmitter-
receiver displacement. Our simulation results show accurate
identification of an attacker’s packet. We also report results from
a sea experiment demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach.
Index Terms—Underwater acoustic communication, Underwa-
ter acoustic communication networks, channel-based security,
cooperative security, authentication, UWAC, sea experiment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Underwater acoustic networks (UWANs) are increasingly
being perceived as a cost-effective means of ocean exploration
and monitoring. While carrying out these tasks, however,
UWANs are left unattended over long periods of time, and
may become vulnerable to external attacks. The recent intro-
duction of standards for underwater acoustic communications
(UWAC) [1] makes these attacks more probable. For this
reason, the investigation of security mechanisms tailored to
the specific UWAC characteristics is currently gaining mo-
mentum. In particular, it has been observed that only in very
specific cases the same security techniques developed for
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terrestrial wireless radio networks can be directly applicable
in underwater scenarios. For example, this is the case of
well-known elliptic-curve cryptography schemes, which have
been evaluated for underwater applications in [2]. In most
other cases, a systematic re-thinking of security schemes and
strategies has to be carried out [3].
The focus of this paper is the authentication of a packet
received by a sink node with the support of trusted nodes.
Authentication mechanisms allow a node to prove that it is
a legitimate member of a network, so that controller nodes
or sinks can trust the data sent by the node. This step is of
great importance, especially in underwater monitoring tasks
and tactical scenarios. The sink’s objective is to determine
whether the packet is coming from either the legitimate node
or the attacker. Conversely, the attacker’s objective is to let
its own packet be recognized as authentic by the sink. The
authentication process is based on the acoustic communication
channel features, rather than on cryptographic techniques.
Trusted nodes cooperate to the authentication process without
knowing its outcome: each trusted node independently sends
authentication data to the sink, which does not broadcast the
authenticity decision, in order to increase the system’s spectral
efficiency and avoid additional security risks. We remark that
the trusted nodes do not need to exchange data in order to
complete the authentication process.
Our approach is based on channel features that mildly vary
over time and space, slow enough such that their distribution
can be approximated as constant during the authentication
process. We choose these features by examining a data set
from more than a hundred sea experiments, and by showing
that the distributions of different channel features –such as
the number of channel taps, the relative delay spread, and
the received power level– are sufficiently stable over time and
sufficiently diverse for different transmitter-receiver pairs. This
makes such features amenable for authentication purposes.
For incoming packets received by different trusted nodes,
we leverage this diversity by systematically measuring the
distribution of the evaluated channel’s characteristics, and by
calculating beliefs that are then transmitted to and processed
by a sink node. The outcome is a measure to discriminate
between packets sent by a legitimate transmitter and packets
received from an attacker. We have tested the performance
of our authentication method both in simulations based on
established acoustic propagation models and in two sea ex-
periments. A comparison with existing approaches and a
theoretical bound are also provided. The results show a very
good trade-off between the probability of detecting an attack
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2and the probability of a false alarm.
In the following, we survey the state of the art in UWAC
authentication (Section II), and describe our system model, in-
cluding the features we use for authentication (Section III). We
discuss our authentication method (Section IV) and evaluate
it through simulations (Section V) and two sea experiments
(Section VI), before drawing conclusions in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Comprehensive reviews of security approaches for underwa-
ter networks are provided in [3], [4], which discuss approaches
for anti-jamming, privacy securing, and covertness. As this
paper focuses on authentication, in this section we consider
only authentication approaches. In [2], an end-to-end authen-
tication scheme has been proposed using the elliptic curve
digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). Secret keys can also
be used for authentication, and in this respect a robust secret
key generation scheme is proposed in [5]. The survey in [6]
covers several forms of cooperation and their application to
underwater networks. Game theory is advocated as a means to
foster cooperation among the nodes. In a security context, this
concept is applied to motivate nodes to behave cooperatively,
and to improve the effectiveness of end-to-end authentication
schemes, which are seen as an important aspect of future
underwater network developments [7].
User authentication has been addressed by the so-called
physical layer security by exploiting the channel coherence,
i.e., messages going from the same source to the same des-
tination are subject to the same channel, whereas a message
coming from a fake source located in a different position will
be subject to a different channel, which can be estimated at
the destination (see [8] for a survey). Various channel features
have been considered in this context. For example, in wireless
radio systems, the power level was considered in [9]–[11],
the impulse response of a wideband channel in [12]–[16],
the frequency response of an orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) transmission in [17], the power spectral
densities in [18], and the time series of the received signal
strength in a data/acknowledgment packet exchange in [19].
When multiple nodes are available, the authentication pro-
cess can be further enhanced. In [20], a distributed authen-
tication in wireless networks was considered where multiple
sensors report their correlated measurements to a fusion center,
which makes the ultimate authentication decision. In [21], a
similar solution using compressed sensing is studied. All these
works typically assume a given channel statistic, which is used
to formulate the authentication hypothesis testing problem.
In [22], this assumption is removed by using logistic regression
techniques, which is applied to the received signal power.
Different from the literature presented so far, our authenti-
cation approach relies on the estimation of the distribution of
selected underwater channel features instead of their instanta-
neous realizations, as opposed to, e.g., [9]–[19]. Unlike [5], we
do not explicitly generate keys starting from channel features;
we do not base our scheme on cryptography (unlike [2]); and
in order to save energy we do not require the transmission
of structured jamming signals, unlike some approaches in [3].
Moreover, most of the existing literature on physical layer
authentication is based on the comparison of a reference
channel with the estimated channel, in a mean square error
(MSE) sense. This approach is optimal when the estimate
is only subject to Gaussian noise but is not adequate in a
UWAC context, where instantaneous channel variations and
noise requires a more elaborate description of the PDF of
the channel estimate (and its variations with respect to the
reference channel). Therefore, we derive the distribution of
the channel features directly from packets received by trusted
nodes, and fuse their beliefs at a sink to make a decision on the
authenticity of the message. Our approach proves valid both
in simulations, where we realistically model the underwater
acoustic channels via ray tracing [23], and in a sea experiment,
proving that the assumptions behind our scheme are valid in
practice.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an underwater acoustic network with a sink
node assisted by N trusted nodes, one legitimate transmitter,
and one attacker. The extension to deployments consisting of
multiple attackers is straightforward. Transmissions are orga-
nized in packets of T symbols. We assume that the first packet
always comes from the legitimate node. Then, the following
packets can arrive from the legitimate transmitter or from the
attacker. Each packet is labeled with a unique identification
(ID) number that prevents replay attacks. Moreover, the trusted
nodes are assumed to be roughly time-synchronized such that
the times at which the trusted nodes receive a packet with
a specific ID (according to their own clock) are within a
reasonable time span of up to one maximum propagation delay
in the network. This prevents the retransmission of the same
packet by the attacker with beamforming/channel modification
techniques aimed at bypassing the authentication procedure.
A. Assumptions about the channel features
In the UWAC channel, the transmitted signal is reflected
both by the sea boundaries and by volume scatterers, such
as plankton and sediments. Moreover, due to the continual
motion of the waves, signals are affected by a Doppler shift
varying up to tens of Hz [24]. The channel is modeled as
a tapped delay line, whose delay spread is in the order of
hundreds of milliseconds [25], with significant variations for
different transmitter-receiver locations. The power attenuation
of the UWAC channel is governed by the propagation loss
and the absorption loss. The propagation loss is a function
of the channel structure and entails a highly non-linear pro-
cess [26]. Moreover, the sound propagation between layers,
characterized by different sound speed (mostly due to water
pressure or temperature changes), leads to both refraction and
additional attenuation. The absorption loss is a function of the
carrier frequency, and is mainly affected by water temperature,
salinity, and pressure [26]. Since propagation and absorption
losses cannot be separated at the receiver, we consider the
overall attenuation level.
Our proposed authentication method relies on features ex-
tracted from the underwater acoustic channel, such as the
3number of channel taps, the channel’s delay spread, and the
received power level. These features are typically location-
dependent, such that the channel realization observed by a
trusted node for packets received from the legitimate node is
different than that observed by an attacker located far from the
legitimate node. Even if underwater channels are time-varying,
we assume that the feature statistics do not change, as long as
the locations of the transmitter and receiver remain relatively
stable. In Section III-C, we will validate this assumption based
on more than 100 sea experiments conducted at various times
and in diverse environments over a four-year period.
Let I be the set of channel features used for authentication,
and xi,n(t), i ∈ I, be the estimated channel feature extracted
at time t ∈ Tφ at trusted node n ∈ [1, N ], where Tφ is the
set of time epochs when a feature xi,n(t) has been estimated
for packet φ. Each random variable xi,n(t) is modeled as a
generalized Gaussian (GG), whose statistics is determined by
the three parameters
ωi,n = (µi,n, σi,n, βi,n) , (1)
where µi,n = E[xi,n(t)] is the mean, E[x2i,n(t) − µ2i,n] =
σ2i,nΓ(3/βi,n)
Γ(1/βi,n)
is the variance, and βi,n is a shape parameter. The
GG distribution is chosen to provide flexibility. In particular, it
models the Laplace distribution (βi,n = 1), the Gaussian distri-
bution (βi,n = 2) and the uniform distribution (βi,n →∞). We
will provide more details on how to obtain these parameters
for authentication purposes both in Section IV-B and in the
Appendix. Then the conditional probability density function
(PDF) of xi,n(t) (for a specific set of parameters ωi,n) is [27]
px|ω(a|ωi,n) = βi,n
2σi,nΓ
(
1
βi,n
)e−( |a−µi,n|σi,n )βi,n . (2)
As anticipated above, we assume that the feature statistics
ωi,n are static during the authentication process, i.e., they do
not change over time, or across different packets for fixed
nominal locations of the transmitter and receiver. The validity
of this assumption is confirmed by more than one hundred sea
experiments, as described in Section III-B. We also carried
out two sea experiments (Section VI) where we successfully
tested the authentication scheme. This further confirms that
the stability assumption is appropriate in practice.
B. Features for physical layer authentication
The key features we use to determine the integrity of an
underwater acoustic transmission are the number of channel
taps, the tap power, the coherence time, the root mean square
(RMS) of the relative delay experienced by the channel taps
with respect to the first tap, and a smoothed version of
the received power. The effectiveness of the authentication
features is provided by the fact that they are relatively stable
over time, so their distribution can be approximated as static,
but varying considerably in space, so that an attacker located
in a different position can be distinguished from the authentic
transmitter. In this section, we discuss the rationale behind our
choice of channel features.
Consider a measured channel power-delay profile Hn(t, τ)
for time t, delay τ , and node n. Define the relevant tap set
Sn(t) = {τ : |Hn(t, τ)| > Th}, where Th is a threshold
chosen to achieve a probability of false alarm of 10−4 in the
identification of relevant channel taps at the output of a nor-
malized matched filter, according to the analysis in [28]. The
following channel features are considered for authentication
by trusted node n:
1—Number of channel taps. The estimated number of
significant taps is
x1,n(t) = |Sn(t)| . (3)
While the number of channel taps could be limited or location-
independent in specific scenarios (e.g., deep water), there
exists a broad class of shallow-water scenarios where the
number of taps can vary widely, depending not only on the
location of the transmitter and receiver, but also on their depth.
For this reason, we consider the number of taps a relevant
authentication feature.
2—Average tap power. From the power-delay profile
Hn(t, τ), we measure this metric as
x2,n(t) =
1
|Sn(t)|
∑
τ∈Sn(t)
|Hn(t, τ)| . (4)
3—Coherence Time. This metric conveys the amount of time
when the channel can be approximated as stationary. Formally,
we define
x3,n(t)=argmax(∆) s.t. NC
(
Hn(t, τ), Hn(t−∆, τ)
)
>0.9 ,
(5)
where NC (α, β) is the normalized correlation between α and
β.
4—Relative RMS delay spread. Call τ0 = min{τ : τ ∈
Sn(t)} the delay of the first tap. The estimate of the relative
RMS delay spread is computed as
x4,n(t) =
(
1
|Sn(t)| − 1
∑
τ∈Sn(t),τ 6=τ0
(τ − τ0)2
)1/2
. (6)
5—Average path delay. The average path arrival delay,
relative to the arrival of the first tap, is
x5,n(t) =
1
|Sn(t)| − 1
∑
τ∈Sn(t),τ 6=τ0
(τ − τ0) . (7)
6—Smoothed received power. Since we expect the received
power to change, we consider the difference between the
current power measurement and a smoothed version of the
previous measurements. Formally, let qn,t be the power of
a symbol received at time t by node n, call t′ the time
when the previous feature measurement was performed, and
let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 be a user-defined parameter. The smoothed
received power is recursively defined as
x6,n(t) = α qn,t + (1− α)x6,n(t′) . (8)
Other channel features can also be used for authentication.
For example, the Doppler shift would seem a good candidate,
since it inherently changes for different transmitter/receiver
locations. However, relying on the Doppler shift for authen-
tication requires the legitimate node to notify others of its
mobility plans. In addition, the attacker can easily impress a
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Fig. 1. Spatial and time dependency of some acoustic channel features: the
red line on each histogram element conveys the 10th and the 90th percentile
for each metric.
given Doppler shift on its packets by resampling its transmitted
signals. These aspects make Doppler shift a comparatively
less robust channel feature, hence in this work we do not
consider it for authentication. Similarly, the time of arrival of
a packet transmission would also be a good channel feature
for authentication purposes. However, the trusted node would
need to cooperate with the transmitter in order to determine
the transmission time: this makes the time of arrival vulnerable
to attacks, and therefore we avoid using it.
C. Statistical analysis of the channel features
In order to assess the sensitivity of the channel features
to the transmitter and receiver locations, we performed a
statistical analysis using time-based channel impulse responses
recorded during more than 100 sea experiments at different
locations, water depths, and times of the year. All experiments
were performed along the Israeli coast between 2001 and
2005, and included the use of various acoustic equipment at
different carrier frequencies. The channels were recorded for
at least 10 s with a resolution of 50 ms. The database format
is reported in [29].
From the database in [29], we selected the experiments that
included more than two nodes, so that we could compare the
differences between the considered channel features in space
at the same time. To capture fluctuations due to environmental
changes on a small time scale, this comparison is performed
for the time series rather than for average values. As the re-
ceivers used similar hydrophones for reception, in this section
we drop the node index n from the notation.
For the same transmitter and a pair of receivers i and j
within the set of receiver pairs R in the same sea experiment,
we evaluate the difference between the time series of the
estimated channel features xj and xi with elements xj(t)
and xi(t), respectively, obtained at the same time instances
t = 0, . . . , TN − 1. The difference between the two time
series provides a measure of the spatial dependency of the
estimated feature. Yet, to be used as authentication metrics,
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Fig. 2. Empirical and theoretical pdf of the number of channel taps from one
of our sea experiments.
the chosen features must also not change significantly during
the acquisition time. As a metric for the comparison, we used
ρc =
1
|R|
∑
(i,j)∈R ,i6=j
∑TN−1
t=0 xj(t)xi(t)√∑TN−1
t=0 x
2
j (t)
∑TN−1
t=0 x
2
i (t)
·
× (1− ρdiff(xj)) (1− ρdiff(xi)) , (9)
where | · | is the cardinality of ·, and ρdiff(xj) is Jain’s fairness
index [30]
ρdiff(xj) =
( TN−1∑
t=0
xj(t)
)2(
TN
TN−1∑
t=0
x2j (t)
)−1
, (10)
used to estimate the variation of the considered channel feature
over time. The value of ρc decreases if a given metric varies as
a function of a node’s location, but remains otherwise stable
over time. Hence, for authentication, those features yielding a
small ρc are preferred.
Fig. 1 shows the average ρc for the different channel features
considered in Section III-B. All features were measured by
estimating the channel impulse response over time (see full
description in [29]), and by processing it to extract the feature
values. While there is a considerable difference between
features estimated at different locations, we observe that the
most significant differences are obtained for the number of
5taps and the relative delay spread, and that such differences
hold in a variety of experiments, as can be inferred from their
small confidence intervals.
Finally, the results confirm that the flexibility offered by
the generalized Gaussian distribution in (2) is indeed required
in practical settings. Figs. 2a and 2b show the empirical and
theoretical PDFs of the number of taps, estimated in our sea
experiment, as observed by two receivers. We observe that
the shape of the distributions is different for each receiver.
This demonstrates why obtaining a specific distribution for the
channel is challenging. Still, due to its flexibility, our estimated
GG distribution (2) is able to capture the empirical PDF quit
well.
D. Assumptions on the Attacker Model
We assume that the attacker is a single malicious node, able
to perform any kind of signal processing on its transmitted
packet. In particular, it has unlimited transmission power
capabilities, it can filter the transmitted signal in order to
let the trusted node estimate a different channel, and it can
superimpose signals onto the message. We also assume that
the attacker knows:
1) the position of both the trusted nodes and the legitimate
node;
2) the training signals used for channel estimation by the
trusted nodes;
3) the instantaneous acoustic channel realization observed
over the link from itself to all of the trusted nodes plus
the legitimate node;
4) the statistical correlation of the above channels with the
channel realizations observed over the links from the
legitimate node to each of the trusted nodes.
IV. AUTHENTICATION METHOD
In this section, we outline the details of our authentication
method. Our scheme aims at establishing the authenticity of a
received packet. This is a hypothesis-testing problem, where
for a packet φ the two hypotheses are
• H0: packet φ is authentic, and
• H1: packet φ is not authentic.
By false alarm (FA) we mean the case where an authentic
packet is classified as not authentic; by missed detection (MD)
the case where a non-authentic packet is classified as authentic.
For a given testing strategy, the FA and MD probabilities are
the probabilities that a FA or a MD occur.
Our authentication is based on the set of features X(φ) =
{xi,n(t), t ∈ Tφ,∀i, n} associated with packet φ. The deci-
sion on X(φ) is made using alternative distributions with
parameters estimated from previously received packets. Let
pX|H(X(φ)|Hm) be the joint PDF of X(φ) conditional upon
hypothesis Hm. Then, for packet φ, the optimal hypothesis
testing strategy is obtained by using the log-likelihood ratio
(LLR) [31] as decision index:
Ψφ = Ψ
0
φ −Ψ1φ , (11)
where (m = {0, 1})
Ψmφ = log pX|H
(
X(φ)|Hm
)
. (12)
The decision procedure for the hypothesis testing problem
therefore becomes
Ĥ =
{
H0 Ψφ < λ ,
H1 Ψφ ≥ λ ,
(13)
where λ is a threshold that trades off between the FA and MD
probabilities.
A. Distributed Authentication
Our authentication method is distributed, as each trusted
node pre-processes each received packet to reduce the amount
of data exchanged with the sink node. In turn, the sink will
determine the authenticity of each packet.1 In the following,
we derive both the data provided by the trusted nodes and the
fusion procedure at the sink.
We assume that a set I of channel features has been prelim-
inarily selected to be used for authentication purposes. In fact,
the chosen set of features matches the characteristics of a given
environment, and is usually designed to extract the maximum
diversity from that environment. We consider (2) as the PDF
of the channel features used for authentication; however, we
do not know the parameters ωmi,n a priori. Instead, we estimate
ωmi,n using all received packets up to packet φ, and we indicate
this estimate as ωˆmi,n(φ) =
(
µˆi,n(φ), σˆi,n(φ), βˆi,n(φ)
)
.
As analyzed in [33] and discussed in [34], we rely on
the spatial diversity of the UWAC channel to assume that
channel variations from the transmitter to each of the trusted
nodes are independent. Under this assumption, we use the
estimated parameters to compute the conditional probability
(m = {0, 1})
pX|H
(
X(φ)|Hm
)
=
∏
i,n,τ∈Tφ
px|ω
(
xi,n(τ)|ωˆmi,n(φ)
)
, (14)
where m = 0 and m = 1 denote the classification of legitimate
and fake, respectively.
The details about the estimate of the parameters ωˆmi,n(φ) are
provided in the next subsections. Plugging (14) into (12), the
LLR (11) is written as
Ψφ =
∑
n
Rφ,n (15)
where
Rφ,n = Ψ
0
φ,n −Ψ1φ,n , (16)
Ψmφ,n =
∑
i, τ∈Tφ
log
βˆmi,n(φ)
2σˆmi,n(φ)Γ
(
1
βˆmi,n(φ)
)
× e−
( |xi,n(τ)−µˆmi,n(φ)|
σˆm
i,n
(φ)
)βˆmi,n(φ)
. (17)
From (15)–(17), we observe that the computation of the LLR
can be split among the N trusted nodes: each trusted node
1We remark that this requires both error control (to ensure reliable trans-
mission from the trusted nodes to the sink) and medium access control (to
regulate the access of the trusted nodes to the UWAC channel). Since the
amount of information exchanged from the trusted nodes to the sink is small
and limited to the value Rφ,n in (16), the above controls can be implemented
using reliable communication schemes [32].
6estimates the parameter set ωˆmi,n(φ), computes the two LLRs
for m = 0, 1, and forwards Rφ,n to the sink. Then, at the sink,
(15) is used to compute the packet LLR.
A bound for the system’s performance, in terms of the
FA and MD probabilities PFA(φ) and PMD(φ) for a given
attack strategy can be obtained by applying the data process-
ing inequality [35]. By defining the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence as
D(pX|H
(
X(φ)|H0) || pX|H(X(φ)|H1)
)
=
∫
pX|H(X|H0) log
pX|H(X|H0)
pX|H(X|H1) dX , (18)
the bound is
f
(
PMD(φ),PFA(φ)
)≤D(pX|H(X(φ)|H0)||pX|H(X(φ)|H1)),
(19)
where
f
(
PMD(φ), PFA(φ)
)
= PMD(φ) log
PMD(φ)
1− PFA(φ)
+
(
1− PMD(φ)
)
log
1− PMD(φ)
PFA(φ)
.
(20)
Under the assumption of independent errors, the KL diver-
gence can be written as
D
(
pX|H(X(φ)|H0) || pX|H(X(φ)|H1)
)
= |Tφ|
∑
i,n
D
(
px|ω(xi,n(τ)|ω0i,n(φ)) || px|ω(xi,n(τ)|ω1i,n(φ))
)
(21)
The closed-form expression of the KL divergence for two
GG random variables is available [36] for either β0i,n(φ) =
β1i,n(φ) = 2, i.e., for Gaussian distributions as
D
(
pX|H(X(φ)|H0)||pX|H(X(φ)|H1)
)
= |Tφ|
∑
i,n
log
σ1i,n(φ)
σ0i,n(φ)
− 1
2
+
(
σ0i,n(φ)
σ1i,n(φ)
)2
+
(
µ1i,n(φ)− µ0i,n(φ)
)2
2
(
σ1i,n(φ)
)2 (22)
or for µ0i,n(φ) = µ
1
i,n(φ) = µ, a special case of the generalized
Gamma distribution, where [37]
D
(
pX|H(X(φ)|H0) || pX|H(X(φ)|H1)
)
= − 1
β0i,n(φ)
+ log
β0i,n(φ)σ
1
i,n(φ)Γ
(
1
β1i,n(φ)
)
β1i,n(φ)σ
0
i,n(φ)Γ
(
1
β0i,n(φ)
)
+
Γ
(
β1i,n(φ)
β0i,n(φ)
)
Γ
(
1
β0i,n(φ)
) (σ0i,n(φ)
σ1i,n(φ)
)β1i,n(φ)
. (23)
The computation of the KL divergence for GG distribution
with general parameters requires the numerical integration
of (18).
B. Estimation of the PDF Parameters at the Trusted Nodes
In order to compute (15) and (16), each trusted node n
must estimate the set of PDF parameters, ωˆmi,n(φ), for the two
hypotheses m = 0 and m = 1. Note that the procedure to
classify the packets as authentic or not authentic should not
imply feedback from the sink to the trusted nodes, as this
would increase the authentication overhead, would also have
to be secured against, e.g., forging or jamming attacks on the
feedback packet. For this reason, no consensus procedures
can be implemented. Instead, here we do not employ any
feedback, but rather propose that each trusted node estimates
all parameters and associates them with the two hypotheses.
Parameter Estimation — As the estimation criterion, we con-
sider the maximum likelihood approach, wherein parameters
are selected in order to maximize the probability of the
observations. Given the parameters, we employ the mixture
model
P
(Xi,n(φ)|ωˆ0i,n(φ), ωˆ1i,n(φ))
=
∏
t∈Tf
1∑
m=0
kmi,n px|ω
(
xi,n(t)|ωˆmi,n(φ)
)
, (24)
where Xi,n(φ) = {xi,n(t), t ∈ Tf , f ≤ φ} (i.e., we use
all observations collected so far), and kmi,n is the prior on
parameter i at node n about hypothesis m (which is also
unknown and must be estimated). We let each trusted node
estimate the set θmi,n = (ω
m
i,n, k
m
i,n).
Let us now define the set Θi,n = {θmi,n,m = 0, 1} and
similarly the corresponding set of estimated parameters at
packet φ as Θˆi,n(φ). Note that θmi,n is not packet-dependent,
in accordance with our assumption that the feature statistics
for both the legitimate node and the attacker do not change
significantly across different packets. However, the estimate
θˆmi,n(φ) is updated after each packet. The estimated parame-
ters Θˆi,n(φ) maximize the likelihood of observing Xi,n(φ).
Taking into account the fact that the observations xi,n(t) are
independent for different t (even when belonging to the same
packet), we have
Θˆi,n(φ) = arg max
Θ¯=(ωmi,n,k
m
i,n)
P(Xi,n(φ)|Θi,n = Θ¯) . (25)
We find the solution of the maximization problem (25) via the
expectation maximization (EM) algorithm [31], as detailed in
the Appendix.
Parameter Association — The EM algorithm provides the esti-
mated parameter sets θˆmi,n(φ), for m = 0 and m = 1. However,
without further information about the expected values for each
of the two classes m = {0, 1}, the association of θˆmi,n(φ) to
hypothesis H0 or H1 is ambiguous. In other words, we do
not know if m = 0 is actually associated with hypothesis H0
or hypothesis H1. Therefore, when fusing all data at the sink,
we must synchronize m across the trusted nodes to ensure that
the same value of m refers to the same hypothesis for all the
trusted nodes.
According to our assumption that the first packet always
originates from the legitimate transmitter, all trusted nodes
assign hypothesis m = 0 to the first packet with index
φ = 0. Then, the labeling m is chosen by matching the
7current estimated variables θˆmi,n(φ) to the measurements from
the first packet, Xi,n(0). Formally, we associate θˆ0i,n(φ) with
hypothesis H0 if
P
(Xi,n(0)|θˆ0i,n(φ)) ≥ P(Xi,n(0)|θˆ1i,n(φ)) , (26)
and from (2), condition (26) becomes∏
t∈T0
px|ω
(
xi,n(t)|ωˆ0i,n(φ)
) ≥ ∏
t∈T0
px|ω
(
xi,n(t)|ωˆ1i,n(φ)
)
.
(27)
After this association procedure, for m = 0, trusted node
n calculates (17) and then the decision index Rφ,n in (10),
according to the θˆmi,n(φ) tuples associated with hypotheses H0,
and H1.
C. Refined Data Fusion
We observe that in the above distributed procedure, two
possible errors may occur: a) a hypothesis association error,
and b) a parameter estimation error. The first error occurs
when m is assigned different values for the same hypothesis
by different nodes, i.e., when test (26) fails. The probability
of occurrence of this error Pe can not be obtained in closed
form. However, when the number of samples goes to infinity
(i.e., the products in (27) have a large number of terms) we
can resort to the Chernoff-Stein lemma [38, Theorem 11.8.3],
which states that the error probability goes exponentially to
zero as a function of |T0|, with exponent given by the KL
divergence (21) computed for φ = 0, i.e.,
lim
|T0|→∞
1
|T0| logPe=−D
(
pX|H(X(0)|H0)||pX|H(X(0)|H1)
)
,
(28)
provided that the parameters ωˆmi,n have been correctly esti-
mated.
To address the hypothesis association error, since the sink
node collects more information than each single trusted node,
we let the sink correct the association by flipping the sign of
the reported Rφ,n as follows. The parameter estimation error
occurs when the observed data is noisy and does not represent
the full feature statistics, or when the attacker manages to
confuse a trusted node. The sink node can still make a robust
decision by weighing the values Rφ,n. The two refinements
are jointly obtained by replacing (15) with
Ψφ =
∑
n
gn(φ) sn(φ)Rφ,n , (29)
where gn(φ) > 0 is a weight to correct PDF parameter
estimation errors, and sn(φ) ∈ {−1, 1} is the binary correction
factor for the hypothesis association.
Choice of gn(φ) — The weighting mechanism reflects the fact
that the physical location of the trusted node matters in two
respects: if a trusted node n is closer to the packet source, be
it the legitimate transmitter or the attacker, the estimate ωˆmi,n
is more reliable. Moreover, if the trusted nodes are spread
around the network area, instead of being clustered close to
one another, it becomes easier to detect that the attacker is
imitating a certain transmitter-trusted node channel. This is
because for each fake packet sent, the attacker can realistically
attempt to mimic the channel only within a limited area.
We use channel feature i? = 6 (the smoothed received
power in Section III-B) as a measure of physical proximity
to the packet source, and formalize the weighing function as
gn(φ) =
(
x¯i?,n(φ)
max
n′
(x¯i?,n′(φ))
)−2
(1 + ζn) , (30)
where x¯i?,n(φ) is the mean of the set {xi?,n(t), t ∈ Tφ}. The
first term of (30) is the normalized weighting function, while
ζn ensures that isolated trusted nodes are given higher weights
than clustered nodes, as they contribute with more information.
To that end, we choose ζn to reflect the variance of the UTM
locations of the trusted nodes, normalized to the closeness to
the packet source. Specifically, ζn =
∑
k 6=n ζn,k, where
ζn,k =
1∑
j 6=k,n x¯i?,j(φ)
·
∑
j 6=k,n
1
x¯i?,j(φ)
×
(
1−
(
p(k)− p(n))T(p(j)− p(n))
x¯i?,n(φ)x¯i?,k(φ)
)
(31)
is a normalized distribution measure between nodes n and k,
and p(`) is the set of UTM coordinates of node `.
Choice of sn(φ) — We choose sn(φ) at the sink node so as to
maximize the agreement among the trusted nodes. We adopt a
majority rule, i.e., let s¯φ ∈ {−1, 1} be the sign of the majority
of reports Rφ,n, then
sn(φ) = sgn(Rφ,n)s¯φ, (32)
so that sgn(sn(φ)Rφ,n) = s¯φ for all n. Also in this case an
analysis of the probability of error in the sign change does not
yield closed-form expressions. Assuming that the choice of the
majority sign s¯φ is correct (i.e., it corresponds to the true hy-
pothesis), and that both the parameters and the assignment (26)
are correct, we consider the probability that any of the N signs
of Rφ,n is not correct. Let pin = P[sgn(Rφ,n) 6= s¯φ]. In this
case, since the parameters and the assignment are correct, we
should not change the sign, and the probability that this error
occurs for at least one n is
Pe,s = 1−
∏
n
(1− pin) . (33)
Now, for small values of pin we have Pe,s ≈ maxpin.
Therefore, resorting again to the Chernoff-Stein lemma, we
can conclude that Pe,s goes to zero as |Tφ| → ∞ exponentially
with exponent
lim
|Tφ|→∞
1
|Tφ| logPe,s
≈ −min
n
|Tφ|
∑
i
D
(
px|ω(xi,n(τ)|ω0i,n(φ)) ||
|| px|ω(xi,n(τ)|ω1i,n(φ))
)
, (34)
where the approximation comes from having considered only
the error probability of the least reliable node n, i.e., the one
having the minimum KL divergence.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed authentication pro-
cedure. The trusted nodes act first (lines 3–7), and the sink
makes the final decision (lines 9–16). The complexity of
the EM algorithm is O (NsymNEM) [31], where Nsym is
8Algorithm 1 Cooperative Authentication Algorithm
Require: Set of channel measurements {xi,n(t), t ∈ Tφ},
i ∈ I, for each trusted node n and for each current and
previous packets φ;
Ensure: Authentication decision for a packet φ;
Begin
1: Calculate ωmi,n, m = 0, 1 (see Section V);
2: for each received packet φ do
3: for each trusted node n do
4: Associate hypothesis m = {0, 1} by (27);
5: Calculate Ψmφ,n from (17);
6: Calculate local decision index Rφ,n by (16);
7: Forward Rφ,n to sink;
8: end for
At the sink:
9: Calculate hypothesis correction sn(φ) by (32);
10: Calculate trusted nodes’ weights gn(φ) by (30);
11: Calculate decision index Ψφ by (29);
12: if Ψφ ≥ λ then
13: packet is authentic;
14: else
15: packet is false;
16: end if
17: end for
End
the number of elements in X (φ) and NEM is the number
of EM iterations. The numerical solution to (39)–(41) is
obtained through the alternating optimization approach [39],
whose complexity is O (N3sym +N2sym +Nsym). The EM
procedure is performed for each of the four estimated channel
feature, and for each trusted node. Finally, the authenti-
cation decision has complexity O (1). Thus, the complex-
ity of our algorithm for authenticating a single packet is
O (4N(Nsym +N3sym +N2sym)NEM). We also note that the
EM algorithm, as well as the alternate maximization process,
provably converge to a local maximum of the log-likelihood
function (35). We explore this convergence numerically in the
following.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We evaluate our authentication approach using realistic
channel simulations obtained through the Bellhop frame-
work [23], an established ray-tracing tool to simulate acoustic
propagation under water. We set our simulations in the Bay
Area of San Diego, CA, between the latitude/longitude co-
ordinates [32.6◦,−117.8◦] and [33.3◦,−117.2◦]. The setting
is characterized by a continental shelf zone with a quasi-
flat bottom, of a depth between 50 and 100 m, followed by
a ridge, which plunges to lower depths. Here we consider
a portion of this area, whose bathymetry map is shown in
Fig. 3. In this portion, the depth ranges from about 10 m
in the top-right corner of the map, to about 450 m in the
bottom-left corner. We assume that the bottom sediments are
mostly sandy and that the sound speed profile decreases almost
linearly from 1520 m/s (sea level) to 1480 m/s (depth 450 m),
which corresponds to an actual measurement taken in the area
Fig. 3. Bathymetry map of the area, showing the location of Alice and the
trusted node deployment area.
during the summer season. Furthermore, we assume a flat
ocean surface.
Fig. 3 also provides a view of our simulation setup. The
locations of the legitimate transmitter (Alice) and the attacker
(Eve) are shown as a red diamond and a black cross, re-
spectively. The distance between the legitimate node and the
attacker is about 1500 m. The trusted nodes are deployed
within the area enclosed in the white frame, which has a size
of about 2 km × 2 km (notice that the scale is different on the
x-axis and y-axis in Fig. 3). As the focus of this evaluation is
on the authentication model itself and not on the design of the
communication between the trusted node and the sink, we do
not explicitly model the links between the sink and the trusted
nodes in the following.
We collect a Monte-Carlo set of 500 simulation runs. In each
run, the location and depth of the trusted nodes are uniformly
drawn at random, whereas the locations of the legitimate node
and the attacker remain fixed. Each simulation run corresponds
to the transmission of a total of six packets from the legitimate
transmitter to all trusted nodes, and of one packet from
the attacker, also directed to all trusted nodes. Each packet
includes 100 symbols, out of which each trusted node produces
100 estimates of the channels’ number of taps (3), relative
RMS delay spread (6), and the smoothed received power (8),
which have been found to offer sufficient diversity to enable
our authentication scheme. Since the transmitted signals were
wideband (relative to the carrier frequency) and transmitted
with high SNR, channel estimates were obtained by processing
the received signals through a normalized matched filter.
Relevant channel taps were determined by identifying the
peaks exceeding a threshold corresponding to a probability
of false alarm of 10−4 according to the analysis of [28].
For each packet, we obtain a different channel estimate by
simulating the oscillation of the nodes around their mooring
location. For each symbol, we perform a separate Bellhop run
where the transmitter and the receiver are randomly displaced
by a short distance from their nominal location. Assuming
a realistic transmission system with 10 kHz of bandwidth,
the power-delay profiles have been filtered such that no two
9arrivals exist whose delays are less than 100 µs apart. The
correlation among different channel realizations is ensured by
the fact that the displacement of each node is small.
We compare our scheme with a typical approach for au-
thentication that is also aligned with our proposal, referred to
as benchmark. This approach compares the 2-norm difference
between a feature of a given impulse response and the same
feature of a reference impulse response. Following [40], [41],
we choose the received power as the compared channel feature,
and the reference channel to be that of the first packet of the
legitimate transmitter.
A. Attack Strategy
To implement the attacker model in Section III-D, we
consider different attacker capabilities which, in turn, enable
increasingly complex attack strategies. The most typical case is
a straightforward impersonation attack, where the attacker tries
to disguise himself as the legitimate transmitter by sending
packets to all trusted nodes. This naı¨ve attack can succeed if,
e.g., the attacker is close to the legitimate node. We model
this attack by using the Bellhop software [23] to estimate
the channel impulse response from the legitimate node or the
attacker to all of the trusted nodes.
A more powerful attack, referred to as TN-1, is enabled
if the attacker can estimate the channel impulse response
between the legitimate node and one of the trusted nodes,
and can leverage an array of transducers in order to approach
this channel response. To compute the channel estimate, we
assume the attacker knows the exact sound speed profile and
the location of both the legitimate and the trusted nodes, but
has an imperfect bathymetry map. Specifically, the attacker
stores the value of the bathymetry for the same set of latitude
and longitude coordinates used in the simulation, but each
bathymetry sample is affected by a constant offset ∆z equal
to 5% of the maximum depth, and by an error drawn at
random in the interval [−0.1∆z, 0.1∆z]. The attacker runs
the same acoustic propagation model provided by Bellhop to
estimate the channel impulse response and then pre-processes
its transmission, such that it will be received as having gone
through the estimated channel between the legitimate node and
the trusted node.
An even more complex attack is obtained by assuming that
the attacker can approximate the channel response between the
legitimate node and multiple trusted nodes, ultimately all of
them. This attack is referred to as TN-x, and makes it possible
for the attacker to disguise itself as the legitimate node, limited
only by its capability to estimate the channels between the
legitimate node and the trusted nodes.
We stress that trying to fool a single trusted node in TN-1
requires several complex steps, including channel estimation,
channel inversion and pre-coding, but may still be possible for
an underwater attacker endowed with a large transceiver array
and sufficient computational power. Instead, fooling multiple
cluster nodes at the same time in TN-x, x > 1, would require
the deployment of multiple, perfectly coordinated transceiver
array elements at different locations in the network area. This
is orders of magnitude less realistic in any practical underwater
scenario.
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B. Determining the Threshold level
In order to make the authentication decision in (13), we
need to determine the decision threshold λ. We offer two
approaches. The first is to determine the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve as a function of the threshold
(ROC test), either theoretically using the relation in 19 or
numerically. The second method is based on a support vector
machine (SVM) to classify the two hypotheses based on the
decision index (SVM-test). For both methods, we divide the
simulation data into a training part and a test part. The
threshold computation is performed only on the training data
set, whereas the data analysis is performed only on the test
set.
In the ROC test, we try a set of threshold values over the
training data and draw the TP rate against the FN rate. We then
determine a desirable working point that trades off between the
values of these two metrics. In the SVM test, we avoid setting
such a trade-off, and instead seek the threshold that yields the
best classification solution. To this end, we perform a K-fold
test to determine the classifier’s parameters, and train the SVM
model based on the training set. Classification is performed
on the test set, and the threshold is determined based on
the minimum decision index from all packets classified as
belonging to the attacker.
C. Simulation Results
We first describe the simulation results for the naı¨ve at-
tacker, which transmits its packets directly, without any pre-
processing. Fig. 4 shows the normalized convergence of the
EM algorithm for the mean parameter µ, averaged over the
trusted nodes and the number of simulations for all estimated
parameters. We observe that, for all estimated parameters, the
EM procedure converges after only 6 iterations on average.
Similar results are obtained for the convergence of σ and β.
In Fig. 5a we assess the average ROC from a) bound (19)
on GG signals with estimated parameters (KL Bound), b)
LLR thresholding on GG signals with estimated parameters
(GG Model), c) LLR thresholding on Bellhop simulations
(Actual). In particular, for a) and b), the bound and ROC are
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obtained using signals generated according to the GG model
and the estimated parameters, respectively. For c) we apply
the detection technique described in the previous subsection
for the estimated parameters from Bellhop simulations. For
all scenarios, we obtain a ROC curve for each parameter
estimation, then for each misdetection probability we average
the false alarm probability to obtain average ROC and bound
curves. As expected, the bound provides the highest true
positive (1 − PMD) probability for the same false alarm
probability, while the ROC obtained from the GG model has
a slightly reduced true positive probability. The effective ROC
shows worse performance due to estimation errors affecting
the GG parameters and to a slight model mismatch between
the Bellhop simulations and the GG model.
Fig. 5b shows the histogram of the decision index, nor-
malized within the [−1, 1] range, for 1,000 simulated test
scenarios, together with the performance of the benchmark
scheme, the SVM test-based threshold, and the ROC test-
based threshold. The latter was set based on the ROC curve
in Fig. 5a, and we choose as a best practice (at least under
the assumption that the channel does not vary significantly)
the knee point in the ROC curve to yield a desired FN
probability of 0.1 and a TP probability of 0.98. The SVM
test-based threshold was obtained from a radial basis function
(RBF) kernel SVM with a K = 5-fold training procedure.
The procedure achieved an excellent authentication accuracy
of 97%. We observe that the decision index values for the
legitimate packets (Alice) and the attacker’s packets (Eve)
are well distinguished. While a similar trend is also obtained
for the benchmark scheme, here the difference between Alice
and Eve is less dominant. Although they have been obtained
through different procedures, the threshold based on the SVM
test is close to the one based on the ROC test. However, the
SVM-based threshold yields a slightly better performance (the
same TP, but lower FN probability).
Next, we explore the performance of our authentication
method against the more advanced TN-x attacker models.
Recall that this requires the attacker to accurately estimate
the bathymetry as well as the location of the legitimate node
and the trusted node. We recall that we favor the attacker by
assuming that it possesses perfect knowledge of the legitimate
nodes and the trusted nodes’ location, knowledge of the sound
speed profile and of the sediments on the bottom (as is
necessary to run the Bellhop propagation model), and slightly
erroneous knowledge of the bathymetry.
We illustrate the authentication algorithm performance for
the case where the attacker attempts to imitate the channel to
a single trusted node (TN-1, Fig. 6a); to two (TN-2, Fig. 6b);
to three (TN-3, Fig. 6c); and to all four trusted nodes (TN-
4, Fig. 6d). Since the packets arrive almost simultaneously to
all of the trusted nodes, the last three cases of TN-2, TN-
3, and TN-4 are infeasible without an advanced and large
transmission array. Still, we evaluate them to show that our
approach remains robust even under largely unrealistic attacker
models. For all cases, we also give the ROC performance as
obtained by the statistical approach and by the SVM approach.
In each caption, we provide the accuracy obtained through
the SVM approach. By comparing the empirical distribution
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Fig. 5. Simulation results of LLR Ψφ from (13) for a naı¨ve attacker. The
obtained authentication accuracy is 97%.
curves of the decision index for the two classes in Figs. 5b
and 5b, we observe that the two classes become expectedly
less distinct if the attacker imitates the channel to a higher
number of trusted nodes. A similar, but less distinctive trend,
is also observed for the benchmark scheme. For our approach
, the results show that, even for the advanced TN-4 attacker,
92% of the packets are still classified correctly. An even
better authentication accuracy of 96% is achieved for the more
realistic TN-1 case.
VI. SEA EXPERIMENT
In this section, we describe the setup and results obtained
from two sea experiments aimed at demonstrating the effec-
tiveness of our authentication method under real sea condi-
tions. In particular, we show the validity of our assumptions
regarding the distribution model, and measure the effectiveness
to separate the legitimate and the attacker through the decision
index (13). One experiment, Exp1, was conducted in May 2017
near the Hadera coal pier in northern Israel, and the second,
Exp2, at the Inter-University Institute for marine sciences in
Eilat, Israel. Exp1 enabled performance evaluation in a larger
11
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Fig. 6. Simulation results of decision index Ψφ from (13) for an advanced attacker.
Fig. 7. Setup of the Hadera (left) and Eilat (right) sea experiments.
network, whereas Exp2 had a longer duration, and thus better
reflects the variations of the UWAC channel over time.
A. Setup
The setup of the sea experiments is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Exp1 included two transmitters (station Tx1 on a pier that
stretches 2 km into the sea, and station Tx2 on the larger
boat), and three receivers (station Rx2 on the smaller boat,
and stations Rx1 and Rx3 on floating buoys). The transmitters
were placed roughly 1000 m apart, and the three receivers
were deployed along a line with spacing of roughly 500 m.
The distances between the receiver on the smaller boat and
the boat and pier transmitters were roughly 300 m and
400 m, respectively. Due to the pier’s thick stone columns, the
transmissions of Tx1 were not received by Rx1. Exp2 included
two transmitters, one on a buoy and one deployed from a boat,
and two receivers, both deployed from anchored buoys. In both
experiments, the water depth was about 25 m, and the modems
and receivers were deployed at a depth of about 10 m. Since
the area in Exp2 is a protected reef, all except the Boat Tx
nodes were moored by scuba divers. During both experiments,
the sea was rough, with a sea level of 3 and waves rising to
over 1.5 m.
In both experiments, we used EvoLogics software-defined
S2CR 7/17 modems to transmit from both transmitters packets
of 100 (Exp1) and 60 (Exp2) chirp-modulated symbols of
10 ms in the frequency band between 7 kHz and 17 kHz
at the source level of roughly 175 dB re 1µPa@1m. The
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Fig. 8. Average per-packet values of the authentication features from sea experiment Exp1 (Legitimate node: Tx 1).
receivers employed a Cetacean CR1 hydrophone, and recorded
continuously throughout the experiment. Analysis was per-
formed off-line. In Exp1, we tested two configurations: one
where node 1 served as the legitimate node and transmitted
seven packets followed by the transmission of two packets
from node 5, which served as the attacker, and vice versa
in the second configuration. Exp2 was longer, as we let both
the legitimate node (Floater Tx) and the attacker (Boat Tx)
transmit sequences of 10 packets one after the other, for a total
of 50 packets each. To allow accurate channel estimation, we
used a guard interval of 0.1 s between each symbol, and set
a gap that stretched from 10 s to 60 s between consecutive
packets from the same transmitter. Exp1 lasted for 5 min for
each configurations, while Exp2 lasted for 70 min. This long
time span allowed capturing instantaneous channel variations,
and testing our assumption in the realistic scenario of drifting
nodes.
As in the simulation discussed in Section V-C where we
did not consider the channels between nodes and sink, also
in the experiments we collect data directly from the trusted
nodes and process it off-line. The choice of channel features
used for authentication is based on our preliminary analysis in
Section III-B, and includes the number of taps (3), the relative
RMS delay spread (6), and the smoothed received power
level (8). Our results show that, to extract the largest degree of
diversity from this scenario, including the average tap’s power
(4) is beneficial due to the different link attenuations. Similar
to our simulations, we estimated those channel features by
thresholding the output of a normalized matched filter.
B. Results
We start by showing the estimated values of the four
authentication features from Exp1. In Fig. 8a, we show the
average per-packet relative delay spread values from the three
receivers. We observe that packets 8 and 9 from the attacker
(Eve) are well distinguished from packets 1-7 from the le-
gitimate node (AL). A similar effect is shown in Figs. 8b
and 8c for the average per-packet number of taps and the
average tap power. Instead, Fig. 8d shows the per-packet
smoothed received power level, and we observe that at Rx3
little difference is sensed between Alice’s and Eve’s. However,
at Rx2 the same metric results in very different values for Alice
and Eve, hence the effect on performance is limited.
Figs. 9a and 9b show the LLR Ψφ obtained in Exp1 and
Exp2 for all received packets. For Exp1, the LLRs from the
legitimate transmitter are stable, whereas for Exp2 we observe
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a variation over time. This is because the longer duration of
the experiment induces slow variations in the stability of the
parameters ωˆmi,n(φ). For both experiments Ψφ for the legiti-
mate node’s packets are well distinguished from the attacker’s
packets. In Fig. 9b we also compare our results with those
of the benchmark scheme. As expected, in realistic conditions
the underwater channel changes over time, hence the decision
index computed by the benchmark cannot distinguish between
the legitimate node’s and the attacker’s packets. Still, as the
distribution of the channel features remains relatively stable,
our approach successfully discriminates authentic packets.
In Fig. 10, we show the difference (or gain), ρGain, between
the average Ψφ for the legitimate node’s packets and the
average Ψφ for the attacker’s packets. For Exp1, the average
was calculated for all packets, while for Exp2, due to the time
variation observed in Fig. 9b, we averaged groups of packets
received over time windows of 10 minutes. To explore the
contribution of each channel feature to the decision index,
we show ρGain when using each of the channel features
alone and all the features together. For both experiments,
the results of our method suggest that the conjunction of all
features achieves higher gains and that, although the smoothed
received power showed high gains, no single channel feature
yields significantly higher benefits than the others. Fig. 10
also shows ρGain for the benchmark scheme applied to the
smoothed received power. The small and sometimes negative
gain reflects that, due to the channel’s time variation, the
benchmark is unable to leverage the diversity offered by
the channel features and authentication fails. By way of
contrast, the results of our method show a significant gain, and
thus good authentication performance, even after 70 min of
consecutive transmissions. Finally, we remark that, as shown
in Fig. 9b, ρGain decreases over time, which implies on the
need to re-estimate the distribution parameters of each features
periodically, although this is only needed once every several
tens of minutes, confirming the robustness of our scheme.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a new cooperative message au-
thentication method for underwater acoustic networks, where
a set of trusted nodes helps a sink node determine whether a
received message was sent by a legitimate transmitter or by an
attacker. Our method leverages the strong spatial dependency
and time-invariance of the distribution of the underwater
acoustic channel features in order to perform authentication
based on the computation of a decision index. This operation
is performed by a set of trusted nodes acting in a distributed
fashion, whereas a sink node fuses the beliefs of the trusted
nodes and makes a final decision. No feedback to the trusted
nodes is required for this. Extensive model-based numerical
simulations, as well as demonstrations in two sea experiments
prove the effectiveness of our scheme. Further work will
extend our approach to intruder detection.
APPENDIX
In the following, we focus on a single channel feature i and
a single node n, and therefore drop the indices i, n from all
notation. To estimate θ(p), we use the expectation maximiza-
tion (EM) algorithm [31, Ch. 17] to update the estimate of θ
iteratively. Denote θ˜(p+ 1) =
(
ω˜m(p+ 1), k˜m(p+ 1)
)
as the
estimate obtained at the end of iteration p.
With the constraint that all estimates within one of the
previously received packets f = 1, . . . , φ must be assigned
to the same hypothesis (m = 0, 1), we define y(f) ∈ {0, 1}
as the label assigned to packet f . Let Y(φ) = {y(t), t ∈ Tf}
be the set of estimated labels for feature i at node n up to
packet φ, and Y (f) = {y(t), t ∈ Tf , f ≤ φ}. Let X¯ (f) be a
subset of X (φ) including only those measurements x that are
obtained from packet f = {0, . . . , φ}. The expectation of the
log-likelihood function at iteration p, is
L
(
θ|θ˜(p)) = E [log (P(X (φ),Y(φ)|θ))|X¯ (φ), θ˜(p)] =
=
1∑
m=0
F∑
f=1
P
(
y(f) = m|X(f), θ˜(p))·[
log k˜m(p) +
∑
x∈X¯ (f)
log px|ωm
(
x|ω˜m(p))] ,
(35)
where log x is the natural logarithm of x and the posterior is
P
(
y(f) = m|X¯ (f), θ˜(p))= k˜m(p)P(X (f)|ω˜m(p))
P
(X¯ (f)|θ˜(p))
=
k˜m(p)
∏
x∈X¯ (f)
px|ωm
(
x|ω˜m(p))∑2
j=1 k˜
j(p)
∏
x∈X¯ (f)
px|ωm
(
x|ω˜j(p)) .
(36)
We maximize the second term of (35) to yield [42],
k˜m(p+ 1) =
1
φ
φ∑
f=1
P(y(f) = m|X¯ (f), θ˜(p)) . (37)
To obtain ω˜m(p+ 1), we maximize the first term of (35)
φ∑
f=1
P
(
y(f) = m|X¯ (f), θ˜(p)) · logP(X¯ (f)|ω˜m(p+ 1)) =
=
φ∑
f=1
P
(
y(f) = m|X¯ (f), θ˜(p))·
·
∑
x∈X¯ (f)
[
log β˜m(p+ 1)−log (2σ˜m(p+ 1))−
− log Γ
(
1
β˜m(p+ 1)
)
−
( |x− µ˜m(p+ 1)|
σ˜m(p+ 1)
)β˜m(p+1) ]
.
(38)
The result is obtained numerically by solving the following
equation for µ˜m(p+ 1):
0 =
φ∑
f=1
P
(
y(f) = m|X¯ (f), θ˜(p))×
×
∑
x∈X¯ (f)
(
x− µ˜m(p+ 1))(|x− µ˜m(p+ 1)|)β˜m(p)−2 ,
(39)
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Fig. 9. LLR Ψφ from the sea experiments, showing significant differences between Alice and Eve.
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Fig. 10. Importance of each channel feature used for authentication in (a) the Hadera experiment and (b) the Eilat experiment.
and then by solving, for σ˜m(p+ 1),
0=
φ∑
f=1
P
(
y(f)=m|X¯ (f), θ˜(p))
∑
x∈X¯ (f)
− 1
σ˜m(p+ 1)
+
β˜m(p)
(|x− µ˜m(p+ 1)|)β˜m(p)
(σ˜m(p+ 1))
β˜m(p)−1
 .
(40)
Finally, for β˜m(p+1), we solve (d(·) is the digamma function)
0 =
φ∑
f=1
P
(
y(f) = m|X¯ (f), θ(p))
 1
β˜m(p+ 1)
+
d
(
1
β˜m(p+1)
)
(β˜m(p+ 1))2
+
∑
x∈X¯ (f)
log
( |x− µ˜m(p+ 1)|
σ˜m(p+ 1)
)
·
( |x− µ˜m(p+ 1)|
σ˜m(p+ 1)
)β˜m(p+1)]
.
(41)
After the convergence of the EM procedure, we calculate
the posterior P
(
y(f) = m|X¯ (f), θ˜(p + 1)), and use it as a
soft decision parameter to assign packet f with set m. To
consistently identify sets m = {0, 1} between the different
trusted nodes, for the first received packet, we determine m =
1 as the set m that yields the highest posterior.
To initialize the EM, we use the k-means algorithm [43,
Section 33.7] to cluster X (φ) into two groups. For each group
m, we evaluate ω˜m(0) using the following statistics for PDF
(2)
E [X (φ)] = µ˜m(0) (42a)
E
[|X (φ)− µ˜m(0)|2] = σ˜m(0)2 Γ
(
3
β˜m(0)
)
Γ
(
1
β˜m(0)
) (42b)
Kurtosis =
E[(X (φ)− µ˜m(0))2]
(E[(X (φ)− µ˜m(0))2])2 =
=
Γ
(
5
β˜m(0)
)
Γ
(
1
β˜m(0)
)
Γ
(
3
β˜m(0)
)2 − 3 . (42c)
where the above mean, variance, and Kurtosis are calculated
using standard methods. Similarly, the prior k˜m(0) is estimated
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as the fraction of the elements of X (φ), which is part of the
mth cluster after the k-means algorithm.
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